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WISCONSIN v. MITCHELL
113 S.Ct. 2194 (1993)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
Todd Mitchell was convicted in Kenosha
County, Wisconsin, of aggravated battery and theft,
an offense which normally carries a maximum two
year prison sentence in Wisconsin. However, because
Mitchell selected his victim solely on account of the
victim's race, Mitchell received four years.'
On the October 7, 1989, Mitchell was among
a group of young black men and boys in an apartment in Kenosha, Wisconsin. The group discussed
a scene from the motion picture Mississippi Burning, where a white man beat up a black boy who
was praying. Shortly thereafter, several members of
the group attacked fourteen year old Gregory
Riddick. Riddick, a white boy, apparently did nothing to provoke the attack. The group beat and kicked
Riddick so severely that he remained comatose for
four days.
While Mitchell did not participate in the beating, he allegedly made two statements prior to the
beating. First, Mitchell asked the group, "Do you all
feel hyped up to move on some white people?" 2
Then, as Riddick walked by, Mitchell pointed at him
and said, "You all want to [expletive] somebody
up?
3
There goes a white boy; go get him."
Mitchell's sentence was affirmed by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, but reversed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court on the basis that "the statute
unconstitutionally infringes upon free speech."4The
A penalty enhancement statute was part of the
Wisconsin law when Mitchell committed the crime. At
the time of Mitchell's trial Wisconsin statute § 939.645
(1989-1990) included the following provisions:
(1) If a person does all of the following, the penalties for the underlying crime are increased as provided

in sub. (2):
(a) Commits a crime under chs. 939 to 948.
(b) Intentionally selects the person against whom
the crime under par. (a) is committed or selects the property which is damaged or otherwise affected by the crime
under par. (a) because of the race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry of that
person or the owner or occupant of that property.
(2)(c) If the crime committed under sub. (1) is
a felony, maximum fine prescribed by law for the crime
may be increased by not more than $5,000 and the maxi-

Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the statute
punished bigoted thought, not conduct, in that it
"punishes the 'because of' aspect of the defendant's
selection, the reasonthe defendant selected the victim, the motive behind the selection."5 The Wisconsin Supreme Court also held the statute to be "unconstitutionally overbroad because it sweeps protected First Amendment speech within its reach and
thereby chills free speech."6 It distinguished antidiscrimination statutes from hate crimes statutes; while
it acknowledged the impact and harm of hate crimes,
it declared the right to free speech more
important
such crimes.7

than the deterrence of
The State appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the importance of the question presented and conflicts among state high courts concerning the constitutionality of penalty enhancement
statutes."
HOLDING
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court.The Court held that the
State's enhanced-penalty statute did not violate the
defendant's First Amendment right to free speech
or beliefs.9 The statute was not unconstitutionally
overbroad and would not effect the right to free
speech in Wisconsin.' 0

mum period of imprisonment prescribed by law for the
crime may be increased by not more than 5 years.
(3) This section provides for the enhancement
of the penalties applicable for the underlying crime_ The
court shall direct that the trier of fact find a special verdict as to all of the issues specified in sub. (1).
2 Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S.Ct. 2194,2196 (1993)

(citing Brief for Petitioner at 4).

3 Id. at 2197 (citing Brief for Petitioner, at 4-5).
4 Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 808 (Wis.

1992), rev'd. & remanded, 473 N.W2d I (Wi. 1991).
5 State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807,815 (Wis. 1992).
6 Id. at 816.
7 Id. at 817.
8 Mitchell, 113 S.Ct. at 2198.
9Id. at 2199-2200.
10Id. at 2201.

ANALYSIS/ APPLICATION
In a unanimous decision written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court declared that the Wisconsin penalty enhancement statute does not violate
the defendant's right to freedom of speech or beliefs. The Court first clarified that the Wisconsin
Supreme Court's characterization of the penalty
enhancement statute was not binding on the Court."
The Court conceded that it is "bound by a state
court's construction of a state statute."' 2 The Court
then qualified this concession with the declaration
that a state court's construction is only binding with
regard to the meaning of a particular word or phrase
within a statute, not the practical effect of the statute.' 3 Therefore, while the state court may construe
the practical effect of the statute in one manner, the
Court has the right to construe the practical effect
of the statute in another,
regardless of the state
4
court's construction.'
The Court did not accept the State's claim that
the statute only punished conduct, not bigoted
thought.' The same assault, committed by two defendants, one of whom selected the victim because
of race while the other did not, would result in the
first defendant receiving a tougher sentence under
the penalty-enhancement statute."'Thus, more than
conduct is punished under the statute. 7 The Court
pointed out that sentencing judges consider many
factors other than conduct when setting a
defendant's sentence.' For example, "it is not uncommon for a defendant to receive a minimum sentence because he was acting with good motives, or a
rather high sentence because of his bad motives.""9
Obviously, the Court did not imply that a sentencing judge is able to consider all factors in determining a sentence. In Dawson v. Delaware,211 the
Court held that "a defendant's abstract beliefs, however obnoxious to most people, may not be taken
into consideration by a sentencing judge"'2 How" Id. at

2198-99.
'z Id. at 2198 (citing R.A.V v. St. Paul,112 S.Ct. 2538,
2541-2542 (1992)).
13
'4

Id.
Id. at 2199.

ever, the Dawson Court also declared that the "the
Constitution does not erect a per se barrier to the
admission of evidence concerning one's beliefs and
associations at sentencing simply because those beliefs and associations are protected by the First
Amendment."2 2 Thus, in Barclayv. Florida,23 a black
defendant's membership in the Black Liberation
Army and the defendant's willingness to start a race
war were factors a judge could consider in sentencing the defendant to death for the murder of a white
man.2 4 The Mitchell Court distinguished Dawson, a
case where the defendant's beliefs were not related
to the defendant's crime, and Barclay,a case where
the defendant's beliefs were considered a motivating factor in the crime.25 Mitchell argued that
Dawson and Barclay did not apply to the case at bar
because neither case involved a penalty enhancement statute.26 The Court dismissed this claim by
pointing out that Barclay involved a death sentence,
which the Court characterized as "surely the most
severe enhancement of all."2 7
Mitchell also argued for the invalidity of the statute based on the grounds that the statute "punishes
the defendant's motive, or reason, for acting."2 8 However, the Court was not convinced by this claim either. Rather, the Court noted that motive plays the
same role as it does in federal and state antidiscrimination laws which bar intentional discrimination.'
R.A. V v. St. PauP does not mandate the Court
to strike down the Wisconsin statute. 3' That case, at
a first reading, appeared to advance Mitchell's constitutional claim. In R.A.V, the Court struck down
St. Paul's Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance on the
grounds that the ordinance was invalid under the
First Amendment.3 2 The R.A.V defendant was
charged under the St. Paul ordinance for burning a
cross in a black family's yard. 33 The Mitchell Court
distinguished the St. Paul ordinance from the Wisconsin statute on the grounds that the ordinance
attempted to prohibit or proscribe "'fighting words'
23
24
2-

2h

463 U.S. 939 (1983).
Id. at 942-944.

Mitchell, 113 S.Ct. at 2200.
id.

15 Id.

28

Id.
Id.

16Id.

2'

Id.

27

1I

Id.

31,112

"'

Id.

31

'9 Id. (citing Tson v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156
(1987)).
2" 112 S.Ct. 1093 (1992).

21

Id. at 1098.

22

Id. at 1094.

32
33

Id.

S.Ct. 2538 (1992).

Id. at 2550.

Minn. Stat. § 292.02 (1990) contains the following language:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, includ-

deemed particularly offensive by the city."34 The St.
Paul ordinance attempted to proscribe speech or
expression, while the Wisconsin statute addressed
3 s
conduct unprotected by the First Amendment.
Thus, the state is entitled to punish some forms of
forbidden conduct more harshly than others if it
determines such penalty enhancement is appropriate.
The Court noted that the Wisconsin legislature
had commendable motives for constructing such a
statute. 36 The Court recognized that hate crimes

often provoke retaliation and stir up community
unrest; also, such crimes are particularly hard on the
victims.3 ' The Court rejected Mitchell's claim that

the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad because
a potential defendant, fearing punishment for an
uncommitted crime, may be chilled in the exercise
of free expression.The Court characterized the claim
as being "too speculative."38 Moreover, the Court

stated that previous declarations by a defendant may
be introduced at a trial to show evidence of a
defendant's motive or intent, so long as such statements comply with evidentiary rules.3 9The case was
remanded for further proceedings.
CONCLUSION
In Mitchell, the Court has taken a stand in hopes
of deterring hate crimes; needless to say the decision has drawn much criticism. Many experts criticize hate crime statutes on First Amendment
grounds, 40 arguing that "these laws tread dangerously
close to criminalization of speech and thought, that
they impermissibly distinguish among people based
on their beliefs, and that they are frequently too
vaguely drafted to provide adequate notice of prohibited conduct."4'

ing, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika,
which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know
arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis
of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
14 Mitchell, 113 S.Ct. at 2200.
35 Id. at 2201.
36

Id.

37

Id.

Id.
39 Id.
4
'See Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You in Jail,
but Can Words IncreaseYour Sentence? Constitutional and
38

Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation Laws, 39 UCLA
L.Rev. 333, 334 (1991).
4, Id.

at 334.

According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, "[a] total of 4,558 hate crime indictments involving 4,755 offenses were reported in 1991.,,4 The
FBI further concluded that of all the hate crimes
reported "60% were allegedly motivated by racial
bias, 20% were motivated by religious bias, and ethnic bias and sexual orientation each motivated 10%
of the hate crimes reported."43 Gaumer points out
that hate crimes have become more prevalent in the
last few years.4 4 Some experts believe hate crime
figures underestimate the actual number of incidents
because many incidents presumably do not get reported or police officers simply45fail to recognize certain hate crimes as being such.
Perhaps in this case, the Court sends a message
to our citizens and courts that where hate crimes
are concerned, enough is enough. Over the last few
years state legislatures have recognized the extent
and consequences of hate crimes, and in response
many have drafted statutes similar to that of Wisconsin.4 6 In Mitchell, the Court firmly endorses one
such statute with a brief and unanimous opinion
that makes a controversial constitutional topic seem
clear and undisputed. In so doing, the Court recognizes that hate crimes are prevalent in our society
and such crimes are damaging not only to the victims but also others who share their race, sex, color,
religion, disability, sexual orientation, or national
origin. Mitchell thus gives guidance to legislatures in
drafting hate crime statutes that do not offend the
Constitution. The existence of statutes will not stop
all hate crimes, but all citizens should hope that such
statutes will be a deterrence.
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
Mark C. Thackston

See Gaumer,Punishmentfor Prejudice:A Commentary on the Constitutionalityand Utility of State Statutory
Responses to the Problemsof Hate Crimes,39 S.D. L. Rev.
1, 5 (1994) (citing the United States Department of Jus42
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43 Id.
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